RECENT CASES
AcTiONs-Lis PENDENS-PLEADIrG---Plaintiff obtained a decree of divorce

in Kentucky, in which an adjudication of the right to alimony was expressly
reserved. Subsequently, defendant removed to Georgia. and plaintiff then instituted a suit against him to obtain alimony. Later, judgment was entered
in the Kentucky court on the divorce decree allowing alimony. Plaintiff then
brought suit in Georgia on the Kentucky judgment, and defendant pleaded in

abatement the pendency of the suit for alimony. I1eld, The plea in abatement
is not good, as the respective causes of action are not the same. Underwood
v. Underwood, 77 S. E. Rep. 46 (Ga., 1913).
It is a. general principle of the law that the pendency of a prior suit for the
same thing, or, as is commonly said, for the same cause of action, between the
same parties, in a court of competent jurisdiction, will abate a later suit. Corn.
v. Churchill, 5 Mass. 174 (i8og); Porter v. Kingsbury, 77 N. Y. 164 (1879);
Brooke v. Phillips, 6 Phila. 392 (1867).
The court bases its decision in the principal case on two grounds: (i) that
the causes of action are not the same as Pone is for a definite liquidated sum and
the other is for an uncertain amount, depending on the special circumstances of
the case and the discretion of the court," and (2) that the same evidence will
not support both causes of action.
In accord, on closely analagous facts to the principal case are Steers v.
Shaw, p N. J. L. 358 (189i); Rogers v. Adell, 39 N. H. 417 (1859); contra Westivelt v. Jones, 7 Ran. App. 70 (898).
The second ground for the decision in the principal case, that the criterion
by which to decide whether two suits are for the same cause of action is whether
the evidence properly admissible in the one will support the other, is stated in
Steers v. Shaw, supra; Steam Packet Co. v. Bradley, 5 Cranch C. C., -93 (U.
S., 1838).

The distinction between lis pendens and resjudicala is that the one is interposed because of the penlency of the first action, the other after its termination;
the one is in abatement of the second suit, the other in bar to defeat it absolutely.
Foster v. Napier, 73 Ala. 595 (1883).
BANKi-CIECKS-PAYMENT

ON FORGED INDORSEMENT OF

PAYEE-W\Vhere

the plaintiff, discounting a note made by S. to M. and B., indorsed in blank in
the name of M. and B. and presented by V., gave to V. a check payable to M.
and B., intending to deal only with M.and B., and the bank paid it on its indorsement in the name of M. and B., forged by S., as had been the indorsement of the
note, it was held that it could not charge the payment to the plaintiff, even if
he was negligent in delivering the check to V.; the circumstances not clearly
charging him with knowledge that V. was an impostor. Kobre v. Corn Exchange Bank, 139 N. Y. Suppl. 890 (1913).
This is in accord with the general rule that a bank which pays a check on a

forged indorsement acquires no right against the drawer, and cannot charge to
his account the amount so paid out. Robarts v. Tucker, 16 Q. B. 56o (i85r);
Belknap v. Bank, 1oo Mass. 376 (868); Washington First Nat. Bank v. Whitman, 94U. S. 343 (1876); Hattoy v. Holmes, 97 Cal. 2o8 (1893); Critten v.
Chem. Nat. Bank, 171N. Y. 219 (90),
While the drawer of a check may be liable where he draws the instrument
in such an incomplete state as to facilitate or invite fraudulent alterations, it is
not the law that he is bound to so prepare the check that nobody else can successfully tamper with it. Soci6t6 G6n6rale v. Metropolitan Bank, 27 L. T.
(N. S.) 849 (1873); Belknap'v. Nat. Bank, supra.
If a bank pays a check on a forged indorsement, it is no defense against a
recovery by the rightful owner. Buckley v. Jersey City Bank, 35 N. J. L. 4oo
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(1872); Bobbett v. Pinkett, i Ex. D. 368 (1876); Welsh v. German American
Bnk, 73 N.Y. 424 (1878); Farmer v. Nashville Fourth Nat. Bank,
100 Term. 187 (IS 9 7).
Moreover, an indorsement by a person bearing
the same name as the payee, but not the real person, is a forgery, and payment
to him will not excuse the bank from paying the true owner of the paper.
Graver v. Amer. Exch. Bank, 17 N. Y. 205 (1858); Ind. Nat. Bank v. Holtsclaw. 98 Ind. 8 (1884).
When a check is issued or indorsed to an impostor, there is a conflict of
opinion as to who must bear the loss. The weight of authority seems to be
that the drawer of the check must bear the loss. Meyer v. Ind. Nat. Bank,27
Ind. App. 354 (19o); Cent. Nat. Bank v. Nat. Metropolitan Bank, 31 App.
D. C. 391 (1908).
BILLS AND NoTEs--lIN

REsr-WAn

Dors IT START To Rux, oN DEUMID

PAPEz-A note made payable "one day after date. . . . vsithout interest,"
properly construed, with regard to the evident intent of the parties, will begin
to bear interest only from the time payment is demanded or suit is brought
thereon. It.is substantially analogous to a demand note, and the general rule
is that interest on a debt payable on demand runs only from the time of making the demand. Pierpoint v. Pierpoint, 76 S. E. Rep. 848 (W. Va., 1912).
This accords with the weight of authority. Horn v. Hansen, S6 Minn. 43
(1893): Culvin v. Marks, 122 Ind. 554 (18o); Huut v. Nevers, 15 Pick.
5o (Mass., 1833); Scudder v. Morris, 3 N. J. L. 419 (I818); Re Herefordshire
Banking Co., L. R. 4 Eq. 250 (1867); Rayne v. Guthrie, Add. 137 (Pa., 1793);
Bre)fogle v. Buckley, 16 S. & R. 264 (Pa., 1827); Trust Co. v. Kennedy, 175 Pa.
16o (z896). The minority rule, contra, is that upon such notes interest begins
to run from the day certain upon which the principal sum is due. Curtis v.
Smith. 75 Conn. 429 (1902); Darling Wooster, 9 Ohio 517 (1859); McMullen

v. Rafferty, 89 N. Y. 456 (1882). The court, in the principal case, flatly refused
to follow the latter rule, saying that it would be an absurdity to apply it to an
instrument in which the "day certain" was the day next following that of making, and in which there was the express stipulation "without interest "--a stipulation certainl- intended to have a practical meaning.
The rule is the more consistent when applied to notes carrying no stipulation as to interest, where the rule is that presentation or demand must be made
at maturity in order to start interest running from that time. Cain v. Morris,
15 La. 494 (1840); Scovil v. Scovil, 45 Barb. 517 (N. Y., 1865); Evans v. Sanders, 8 Port. 497 (Ala., 1839); Rayne v. Guthrie, supra.
BILLs AD NoTEs-Ri-mrs oN INDORSFEU3rT-HoLDER wNDuc Couasz-

N. . L.-The decision in McCarty v. Kepreta, 139 N. W. Rep. 992 (N. D.,
1913), is an interpretation of 1i 6354 and 6358, Rev. C. of N. D., of Negotiable
Instruments Law, (Of 52. 6, Pa.), providing that a holder in due course Is a
holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions, inter alla
(4), that at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of the infirmity
in the instrument or defect of title of the person negotiating it; and to constitute
notice. . . . (the holder) must have actual knowledge of such facts that his
action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith. The action was replevin
to secure goods (for foreclosure purposes) covered by a mortgage given as security for a note; the defense was that the note was given as accomodation to a state
bank, that it was under a local statute illegal by reason of excess and that plaintiff, president of the bank, could not be a holder for value under the Act, even
though he paid value for it upon the assurance of the cashier that it was good.
Ield: The Act must neces..arily be construed with, and as supplemented by,
statutory provisions or general laws regulating the relationship of the parties.
Here the cashier was managing officer and the plaintiff president was a member
of the birrd of directors ex aoicio, and the bank through its cashier is affected
w;th notice of all the defenses. Any notice a director has, or ought to have
officially, he has or will be conclusively presumed at law to have as an individual.
The plaintiff is not under the Act as quoted a holder for value.
The question involved arises here for the first time under the N. I. L. Decisions before the Act, in accord are Morris v. Loan Co., 109 Ga. 12 (t 899);
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Shedden v. Heard, ito Ga. 461 (9i o); Pond v. Waterloo Co., So Ia. 096 (879).
Contra, King v. Doane, 139 U. S. x66 (x89o). See Brannan on Negotiable

Instrument Law,

§§52,

S6.

Co.TRAcTs-ILLEGALiTY-AucTzON SAEs-B, a bidder at public sale,

promised A, another bidder, to sell A the goods for which he was bidding at a
certain price, if A would withdraw from the bidding. A withdrew, but was
later unable to raise the required amount. B then promised A to hold the
offer open for a certain time if A would raise a less amount. A, after much
trouble, raised the amount within the time; but B refused to sell him the goods.
In an action by A v. B, it was held that the first agreement was illegal- being
contra bonos mores and that the subsequent agreement was independent of it
and valid. Owens v. Wright, 76 S. E. Rep. 73S (N. C., 1912).
The decision is in accord with the general rule. The rule is that the enforcement of an agreement by which bidding at a public sale is suppressed is contra
bonos mores; and the law will not assist either party to such an agreement. Ingrain v. Ingrain, 49 N. C. i89 (1846).
If the original transaction is illegal and a new promise is made, which is
dependent upon, and connected with, the illegal act, there is no basis for recovery,
no matter how many times and in how many different forms the new promise
may be made; for repeating a void promise will not give it-validity. Seiden.
bender v. Charles, 4 S. & R. Is (Pa., i818). Accordingly, every new agreement in furtherance of, or for the purpose of carrying into effect, any of the
unexecuted provisions of a previous illegal agreement is void. Brown v. Kennedy, 12 Colo. 235 (1888).
11here, on the other hand, the new contract is formed on a new consideration, and has no direct connection with the illegal transaction, but is collateral
to it, including no right or claim belonging to it, the new contract is valid and
enforceable. De Witt v. Brisbane, 16 N. Y. 508 (1858); Swan v. Scott, z S.
& R. 155 (Pa., 1824).
The question, in cases similar to the principal case, is, therefore: can the
plaintiff establish his case otherwise than through the medium of an illegal transaction, to which he was himself a party?
DAMAGES-MEASURE-Loss oF SocIETY OF SON TO PAsRENTs-An action

was brought by the parents for death of a son, who was of age, under the Federal Employer s Liability Act; it was held, in American R. Co. v. Didricksen,
33U. S. Sup. Ct. 224 (1912), that the damages should be restricted to the actual
fnane l injury sustained by the parents and that no allowance should be made
for loss of society or companionship, or for any care or considdration the son
might havc manifested towards them during their declining years.
The right of action for loss of life is of purely statutory creation and, therefore in order to ascertain what damages are recoverable the various statutes must
be resorted to. Ordinarily the rule is that recovery shall be limited to financial
damages whether the action is for the benefit of wife, husband, parents or children. Blake v. Midland Ry. Co., 18 Q. B. 93 (x852); Lett v. St. Lawrence Ry.
Co., ii Can. App. I (1884); Michigan R. R. v. Vreeland, 33 Sup. Ct. 122 (U. S..
1912). But the damages are not confined to present and immediate pecuniary
losses, but may includ . prospective losses. Carter v. West Jersey R. R., 76 N.
J. L. 602 (1908). In several jurisdictions, however, damages not strictly pecuniry are recoverable, particularly where minor children are the claimants.
Tilley v. Hudson River R. R., 29 N. Y. 252 (1864); Mclntire v. N. Y. C. R. R.,
37 N. Y. 287 (1867); Countryman v. Fonds R. R., 166 N. Y. 201 (I9ox); Webb
v. D. R. G. R. R., 7 Utah, 17 (i8go); Green v. So. Cal. R. R., 132 Cal. 254 (190).
In at least two jurisdictions recovery is allowed for mental anguish as well as
loss of society. Matthews v. Vainer, 29 Grat. 570 (Va., 1877), C. & 0. R. R.
v. Ghee, 110 Va. 526 (i9:o); Cleary v. City R. X., 76 Cal. 240 (1888).
Where a parent sues for the loss of a child, the recovery is limited to pecuniary injuries. Paulmier v. Erie R. R., 38 N. J. L. 151 (187o); Diebold v. Sharp
19 Ind. App. 474 (1898); Pressman v. Mooney, 5 App. Div. 121 (N. Y., i896),
Pa. R. R. v. Keller, 67 Pa. 3oo (1871); Sutherland on Danmges, § 1273. No
allowance is to be made for loss of society. WVales v. Pac. Co., 13o Cal. 521
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(Igoo); Pupper v. So. Pac. Co., xo5 Cal. 389 (1896). The pecuniary injury need
not be exactly proved on trial, and even where the child was a mere infant when
killed, the court will not be justified in granting a non-suit or directing nominal
damages. IhI v. Forty-Second Street R. Co., 47 N. Y. 321 (1867); but see So.
Pac. R. R. v. Cavenia, xoo Ga. 46 (1886). The possibility of future support
may be considered by the jury in assessing the damages, go Pa. 1 (1879); Erven
v. Chicago, etc., R. R., 38 Wisc. 613 (1875). When the child was a minor his
disposition and ability to support his parents after reaching his majority was
considered too vague in Esker v.Mineral R. R. Co., 28 Sup. Ct. 393 (Pa., x9o5);
conlra, Thompson v. Johnson, 86 WVis. 576 (z893).
EviDENcE-ExPERTs---MEicAL Boos-In Denver City Tr. Co. v. Gawley,
129 Pac. 258 (Col., 1912), it was held that medical books are not admissible in
evidence, and that where a physician confined his testimony to his experience,
cross-examination as to whether he agreed with writings of a medical author was
improper unles he first testified that he read the author and regarded his work
as of sufficient merit on which to base his opinion.
This is inaccord with the general rule that medical authorities may not be
used to contradict an expert generally. Macfarland's Trial, 8 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)
57 (N. Y., 1870); Davis v. State, 38 Md. i5(1873); Knoll v. State, 55 Wis. 249
(1882); Marshall v. Brown, 50 Mich. 148 (1883). There are cases to the contrary, however; Hutchinson v. State, 19 Neb. 262 (1886): State v. Winter, 72
Iowa, 627 (1887); Thompkins v. West, 56 Conn. 478 (1888); Hess v. Lowrey,
122 Ind. 225 (i8go); Fisher v. R. Co., 89 Cal. 399 (189i).
Where a physician bases his opinion upon certian medical works, the authorities may be used to contradict and discredit him. State v. Wood, 53 N. H.
484 (1873); Huffman v. Cluck, 77 N. C. 55 (1877); City of Bloomington v.
Shrock, 110 I1. 219 (1884).
Many authorities hold that medical books are not competent evidence.
People v. Wheeler, 6o Cal. 58i (1882); People v. Hall, 48 Mich. 482 (1882);
Com. v. Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68 (1889); U. P. R. Co. v. Yates, 79 Fed. 584
(1898); Bixby v. Omaha & C. B. R. & B. Co., io5 Iowa, 293 (1898). Nor do
medical works c..me within a statute admitting as evidence "books of science"
to prove "fac:s of general notoriety or interest." Gallagher v. Market St. R.
Co., 67 Cal. 13 (1885); Bixby v. Omaha Co., supra; U. P. R.Co. v. Yates, supra.
Other dfithorizies hold that medical authorities admitted or proved to be standard
works with the profession may be used in evidence. State v. Winter, supra; Birmingham, etc., Co. v. Moore, 148 Ala. 115 (19o6).
Outside of the states of Iowa and Alabama, there seem to be no well-con.
sidered cases upholding the admission of medical books in cases like our principal
one. In those states technical and obscure phrases should be explained by experts. Stoudenmier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. .558(£857).
INFANTs--NEcESSARIES-SERVICE OF ATTORntY-A suit was brought in
the name of an infant, by the direction of her next friend, to protect the infant's
title to real estate. h1eld, that the counsel could not recover against the infant
for services in such suit as they are not regarded as necessaries, and may be
avoided by the infant, even under an express promise. Grissoun v. Beidleman,
129 Pac. Rep. 853 (Okla., 1913).
Itis generally a question of fact in each case to determine what are "necessaries." Lord Coke considers necessaries of an infant to include "victuals,
clothing, medical aid, good teaching and instruction whereby he may profit himself afterwards," Co. Litt. 172 a. Parsons on Contracts, p.246, added "counsel
fees and expenses of a law suit," but in Thrall v. Wright, 38 Vt. 494 (1866), the
court said this could not be taken as a general rule, but the circumstances of each
case must govern.

The general rule was stated in Mclsaac i. Adams, 190 Mass. 117, 19o6.

"We can conceive of conditions such that a minor may be bound to pay reasonable compensation for the services of an attorney, on the ground that they were
necessary; but ordinarily this liability is limited to cases where the services are
rendered in connection with the minor's personal relief, protection, or liberty,"
and refused to extend it to a case where services were rendered regarding land.
Accord, Phelps v. Worcester, ii N. H. 5i (1840); Englebert v. Troxell, 40 Neb.
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195 (1894); Dillon v. Bowles, 77 Mo. 603 (1883), although infant was greatly
benefited by result. In Thrall v. Wright, supra, the suit was regarding a note.
But in Searcy v. Hunter, 8i Tex. 648 (i89i), the court said "Looking to tht
condition of affairs in our own state, it seems to us that to refuse to allow an
attorney, who at the instance of the next friend has instituted a suit in behalf of
the minor and recovered for him money or property, to claim from the infant a
reasonable compensation for his services would be to establish a rule which would
operate to the prejudice of the class it is designed to protect." And where there
is no guardian, the infant's estate is liable for its fees of counsel whose services
contributed to secure it. Epperson v. Nuggent, 57 Miss. 45 (1879). And, of
-course, when Chancery directs the guardian ad liter to employ counsel, the

-Chancellor will set aside a reasonable fee for the counsel. Colgate v. Colgate,
23 N. J. 372 (187).In the foll9wng cases the services of counsel were held to be necessaries,
'hence the infant could not avoid the liability. Crafts v. Carr, 29 R.L 3
(1902); prosecution of an action for indecent assault. Helps v. Clayton, 17
B. [N. S.] 553 (Eng., 1866), services for drawing up a settlement. Sutton v.
Heinze, 84 Kan. 756 (i9 i), suit for personal injuries. Munson v. Washband,
33
3), damages for breach of promise. Barker v. Hibbard. 54
H. 539 (1874), defending a minor in a bastardy proceeding.
The principal case is very valuable for the complete collection of authorities.

INFANTs-RIGHT OF Acliox-INJuRY TO UNnORN Cins.--An unborn child
is not in existence so as to be entitled to the protection of his person as well as
his property, and may not recover damages for a deformity due to the negligence
of a railroad company in transporting its mother, then pregnant. Nugent v.
Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 139 N. Y. Sup. 367 (1913).
The case is in accord with the authorities, which are three. Walker v.
Great Northern R. Co., 28 Irish L. R., Q. B. & Ex. Div. 69 (1891); Dietrich
v. Northampton, x38 Mass. 14 (1884); Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ifl.
.359 (i9oo). These cases recognize that if a child is born alive and afterwards
dies of injuries received while in utero it is murder or manslaughter. 4 B1.Coin.
198; Rex v. Senior, i Moody C. C. 346: Regina v. West, 2 C. & K. 784 (1848).
And is in esse as far as the usual rights of property are concerned. It may take as
heir or devisee. Botsford v. O'Conner, 57 III. 72 (1870); Morrow v. Scott, 79
Ga. 535 (1849); Bowen v. Hoxie, 137 Mass. 527 (188.); Anbuchon v. Bender,
44 Mo. 56o (1869); Marsellis v. Thalhicmer, 2 Paige 35 (N. Y., 183o); Laird's
Ap. 85 Pa. 339 (1877). And may maintain an action for the death of its father
for culpable negligence. Quinlen v. Welch, 69 Hun. 584 (1893); R. R. v. Robertson, 82 Tex. 657 (iS9I); lierndon v. R. R. 128 Pac. Rep. 727 (Oki., 1912). A
guardian may be appointed for it. Marseilles v. Thalhinemer, supra. It may have
an injunction to stay waste and be a ppointed an executor. Quinlen v. Welsh,
supra; i Wms. Exrs. *232, 6th Am. Ed. Admitting this much, it is difficult to
see why it should not be treated as in esse for all purposes, and why a distinction
is drawn in this class of cases, especially since it has been held that the mother
could not recover for injuries so inflicted to her child. Dulieu v. White, 2 K. B.
669 (1901).
JUDGMENTS-INDEx-NAME OF DEUTOR-SeVeral persons living in the same
locality as the judgment debtor had the same Christian and surname. The
judgment did not properly set forth the debtor's correct middle initial and was
so rendered. Ifeld: that such judgment was ineffectual against a subsequent
mortgagee without actual notice. Lature v. Little, 6o So. Rep. 474 (Ala., 1912).
'Ihe common law rule of but one Christian name and one surname, and that
-a wrong middle initial or name is immaterial will certainly not answer the modern
requirements of business with reference to recorded conveyances being notice
to the world." Bank v. lacoda Mercantile Co.; 169 Ala. 476 (i91o). In accord
with the principal case are: Dutton v. Simions, 65 Me. 583 (1876), judgment
against Henry 'M." Hawkins is not binding on the estate of Henry 4." Hawkins. Davis v. Steeps, 87 Wis. 472 (1894), docket entry against "Edward Davis, "
no lien on estate of 'E. A. Davis" or "Edward A. Davis." Crouse v. Murphy,
340 Pa. 335 (1891), judgment entry of "Daniel Murphy" is not constructive
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notice of lien against estate of "Daniel J. Murphy." Delaney v. Becker, z4r
Sup.392(390),judmen
agins "GergeA. ake" i no noiceof lien against
S.
(1902); Stone
it Thefo
rs,
•4So
RP. 9~ (Ms. 191).
A mortgage defectively rcorded and indexed by erroneously changing the
initial of the name of the mortgagor, is not binding upon subsequent purchasers without actual notice, Prouty v. Marshall, 225 Pa. 570 (I909. But in
Johnson v. Davy, 2 N. D.295 (189), a mistake in the middle initial of the mortgagors name, in foreclosure proceedings, was immaterial as the law recognizes
but one Christian name. And in Fincher v. Hanegan, 59 Ark. I5r (1894), a
mortgage executed.by Henry "M." Ward, by the name of Henry "N." Ward.
gave constructive notice, where it did not appear that there was more thanone Henry Ward in the county.
* As to misnomer in
i of process, see Illinois R. R. v. Hausenwinide, I5.
L. R. A. (N. S.) 129 and notes (Ill., z9o8); Butler v. Smith, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.)436 (Neb., z9og).
Mum cip A

Coaroros-PowEs-ToRTs-A

municipal corporation,

divided a fract of common land within its limits into building lots, and leased
the same for summer cottages. The tract was not required for public purposes.
A strip of land bounding the tract was reserved by the town and intended by it
as a common passageway to the leased lots. While lawfully on this reserved strip
the plaintiff was injured through the negligence of the defendant town and under
circumstances giving her a right to go to the jury had the defendant been a private corporation or a natural person. The defense was that the acts of the defendant upon which the plaintiff relied were ultra rites, nad therefore that it was
not answerable. Ildd, that the plaintiff might recover. Davis v. Rockport, ioo.
N. E. Rep. 612 (Mass.,

93 ).

It has been repeatedlyheld that a municipal corporation may deal with its
property as a private individual for its own benefit when and at such times as.
the property is not required for the public use for which it was designed. The
question has usually arisen on the leasing of public buildings for entertainments
shops, ec. Camden v. Village, 77 Me. 530 (1886); Worden v. New Bedford, 13z
Mass. 23 (882); Bell v. Plattuille, 71 Wis. i42 (888); Bates v. Bassett, 6o Vt..
530 (895); Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. 7! (Mass., 385!); French v. Quiney, 3.
All. 9 (Mass., 1862); Oliver v. Worcester, 302 Mass. 489 (3873), in which the
court said that a municipality may hold or deal with its property "not for thedirect and immedite use of the pubic,"but for its ownbenefit, by receiving
rents or otherwise, i the same manner that a private individual might." While
such uses, by the weight of authority, would be dlra sres if foreign to the pnmary objects of the corporation, yet they are valid when incidental to a legitimate primary object, being in fact essential to economy and the best management of the corporate property.
Under the Massachuses doctrine, which is followed throughout New England, a town is not liable for injuries caused by a defect or want of repair in publicproperty used solely for a public use, such duties being imposed on all towns by
a general act. Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812); Hill V. Boston, 122 Mas
344 (1877). This doctrine follows the English view as expressed in Russell v.
Devon Co., 2 D. & E. T. R. 667 (1788), and seems to be more restricted than thegeneral American doctrine. Pray v. Jersey City, 32 N. J. L. xo8 (1840); Larkin
v. Saginaw Co., :1 Mich. 88 (86t); Calvert Co. v. Gibson, 36 Md. 229 (1872);
Hedges v. Madison, 6 I1. 567 (1846). However, under either rule it seems to.
be well settled that when the corporation receives a consideration or legitimately
leases its public property to private persons for a private use, it stands in the
same relation to such persons as would a private corporation or a natural person..
and is therefore liable to them, as in the principal case, for injuries caused by a.
failure to keep the leased premises in proper repair. Worden v. New Bedford,
131 Mass. 23 (1882); Mac key v. Vicksburg, 64 Miss. 777 (1887); Carrington v.
St. Louis, 89 Mo. 208 (191o); Rowland vi. Kalamazoo, 49 Mich. 553 (1882);.
Suffolk v. Parker, 79 Va. 660 (885); Savannah v. Cullens, 38 Ga. 334 (1884);.
Guthrie v. Philadelphia, 73 Fed. 688 (1896).
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NEGLIGEN CE-DEATE OF INJURED PARTY-SURVVAL O7 AcTiox-In Crider
v. Moorhead, 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 532 (1912), an action for damages was begun by
plaintiff's decedent for injuries sustained through defendant's negligence; but
before trial death intervened-whether from the injury in question or from other
causes does not appear-and his personal representatives were substituted,
under 18 of Act of I85t, P. L.669, which provides that "no action hereafter
brought to recover damages for injuries to the person by negligence or default
shall abate by reason of the death of the plaintiff;but the personal representatives
of the deceased may be substituted as plaintiffs.......' The defense contended that this section was limited by the succeeding section (1 I9)which provides "that whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence,
and no suit for damages be brought by the party injured during his or her life,
the widow of any such deceased,
.
...
or personal representatives,
may maintain an action.
. .....
Held: The cause of action, having
accrued to the decedent in his lifetime, would under §18 survive to his personal
representatives. This section creates only survivorship of an existing cause of
action. Nor is it limited by J 19, so that it need appear that the death isthe
result of the injury complained of.
The eighteenth section provides for survival of an existing cause of action.
R. R. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. 38 (1858); Hill v. R. 11. 178 Pa. 223 (igxo); while section
nineteen creates a new cause of action wholly unknown to the common law, in
that it provides recovery where death might be the immediate and direct consequence of the negligent act, in which case no right of recovery ever vested in
the injured party, nor any other person at common law. McCafferty v. R. R..
193 Pa. 339 (899); R. R. v. Henderson, 51 Pa. 315 (1865); Penna. R. R. v. MoCloskey, 23 Pa. 526, 530 (1854); Fink v. Garmen, 40 Pa. io3 (1861); Birch v.
Ry., 165 Pa. 339 (1895).
NEGL1ENCE-INJURIES TO CntLunDE-The defendant caused one of its
wagons to be driven through a city street at a walk, from which its servants discharged advertising whirligig toys, or aeroplanes. The plaintiff, a boy of ten,
followed the wagon with other children to get the toys when they fell to the
ground. One of the toys falling under the wagon, the plaintiff reached between
the wheels for it, but before he could withdraw, the back wheels of the wagon
passed over his arm, crushing it. IIdld, that the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover under the turntable doctrine and in absence of proof of actionable negligence the defendant is not liable. Hight v. American Bakery Co., 151 S. W.
Rep. 776 (Mo., 1912).
The plaintiff based his complaint and tried the case solely upon the "turntable" theory. That court laid down the rule which was expressed in Bottum
Adm. v. Hawk, 84 Vt. 370 (1911), "that the rule (turntable) is to be invoked not
as a foundation for the liability of the defendant, but to meet the defense of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, a child, injured. It is applied
not as a weapon of attack or a ground for liability, but as a defense."
The germ of the "turntable" doctrine was expressed in Lynch v. Nurdin, !
A. & E. (N. S.) 442, (Eng., 1840) and applied in R. R. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657
(U. S., 1873) and Cooke v. Midland Ry., L. R. App. Cases, 229 (i9o9). For
citations, see Bohlen's "Cases on Torts," 223.
The turning point of the case was whether the wagon was such an "attractive nuisance" as to cast upon the defendant the affirmative obligation to guard
against such acts of the plaintiff. The court held that it was not. In Conlin v.
Saunders, 58 Ill. App. 261 (1895), nothing so dangerous about an ice wagon to
cast upon owner adcitional duty; accord, Valsh v. Hays, 72 Conn. 397 (1889);
Lowry v. N. Y. Ice Co., 55 N. Y. S.707 (1899). Nor a skeleton wagon for conveying stone, Foster Herbert Cut Stone Co. v. Pugh, it5 Tenn. 688 (19o6).
Tracton Engine, Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Burns, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 412
(i9o5). Coal Wagon, Scott v. l'eabod y, I3 Ill. App. io3 (191o). Cable, drum
and boomer, Fitzgerald v. Rodgers, 58 N. Y. App. DIV. 29P (1901).
But the following have been held to be such attractive nuisances as to impose the additional duty and relieve the plaintiff from defense of contributory
negligence. Iron carelessly piled in wagon which was allowed to stand on street
Lane v. Atlantic Works, 107 Mass. 104 (1871) and Bohlen's "Cases on Torts,'
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for citations. Wagon attached to a moving house, Skinner v. Knickrehm,
io Col. App. 596 (1909). Horseroller left on street, WesterficId v. Lewis, 43 La.
Ann. 63 (1891). Street scraper, Kelley v. Parker, Washington Co., 107 Mo.
Vagon containing explosives, Lamsoni v. Saginaw City Gas
App. 490 (1904).
Co., 148 Mich. 27 (1907), by a divided court.
For a full discussion of "attractive nuisance," see Cahill v. Stone Co., 153
Cal. 571 (1908); x9 L R. Co. (N. S.) 1944 and notes.
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NuXsAucE-Co.NNuiNo INJuiYt-DAmAGEs-Where the builders of a
railroad wrongfully blasted rock into a river so as to divert its channel and in
times of high water cause a riparian owner's land to be overflowed, a release in
full by that owner's grantor given at the time of creating the obstruction will not
bar action by the new owner; not being created under any semblance of right.
unlawful and wrongful from the outset, so long as any recurring injury results,
actions may be maintained by the then owner. Turner v. Brooks & Sons, t5z
S. W. Rep. 948 (Ky., 1912).
This accords with the universal rule that the continuance and every use of
that which is, in its erection, a nuisance is a new nuisance. Staple v. Spring, io
Mass. 72 (1813); Jones v. Deberry, 2 N. C. 248 (z795); Beckwith v. Griswold, 29
Barb. 291 (N. Y., 1859); Russell v. Brown, 63 Me. 203 (1874); Sanitary Dist. v.
Ray, i99 Il.63 (1902). Failure to abate the nuisance after first recovery had
aggravates the injury and enlarges the damages recoverable in a second action
for continuance. Ganster v. Electric Co., 214 Pa. 628 (19o6); Mulligan v. Augusta, 115 Ga. 337 (1902); Bowers v. Boom Co., 78 Minn. 398 (t899).
The theory of the law is that the infliction of damages in the first action will
cause the abatement of the temporary nuisance, and if it does not, successive
actions are maintainable, in which damages, compensatory and exemplary, may
be awarded until discontinued. Ry. Co. v. Pattison, 67 I1. App. 35i (1890);
Brakken v. R. IL 32 Minn. 425 (j884); McKee v. R. R- 49 Mo. App. 174 (1892).
PARENT AND CHILD-RIGHT OF FATHER To REASONABLE AccEss To BASCiniL--Baker v. Baker, 85 At. Rep. 816 (N. J., 1913) held that such right
in the father would be recognized in a court of equity.
At common law the father had the paramount right to the custody of his
legitimate minor children, this right springing naturally from his duty to maintain, protect and educate them. The right, however, can hardly be said to have
ever been absolute, but several English law cases permitted the father to obtain
custody of his child under circumstances injurious to the child. Rex v. DeManneville, 5 East 221 (1804), infant, eight months old, taken from mother;
Rex v. Greenhill, 4 Adol. & E. 624 (1836), father was living in adultery. These
cases resulted in the passage of Lord Talfourd's Act (1839) and the Infants'
Custody Act (1873), enlarging the powers of chancery courts and emphasizing the
importance of making such orders, in respect to custody, as will best further the
well being of the child, even though the strict legal right of the father might be
.disregarded. That is practically the attitude that the American courts have
Wend.
always taken. U.S. v. Green, 3 Mason 482 (1824); Mercein v. People, 2.5
64 (N. Y., 1840); Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn. 29t (1897); Hussey v. Whiting,
145 Ind. 58o (t896); Richards v. Collins, 45 N. J. Eq. 283 (1889). It is well
established that either parent has the right of reasonable access to the children
in the custody of the other parent.
As to illegitimate children, the rule is that the mother is the natural guardiau
of her bastard child, and, as such, has a legal right to its custody superior to the
right of the putative father or any other person. Reg. v. Nash, 1o Q. B. Div.
454 (1883); Lipsey v. Battle, 8o Ark. 287 (9o6); Ramsay v. Thompson, 71 Md.
Haas, 7 N. J. Eq. 689, 694 (io6)contains a dictum
188).
at tat theativee
the mother 's right is inferior to the putative
the et8);Hssfecv
y Garrison, V. C.. to the
father's. The mother will be deprived of the custody of her bastard child if her
manner of living and habits render such action necessary in order to promote the
well-being of the child. In re Hope, 79 R. 1. 486 (1896); Fullilove v. Banks, 62
Miss. zi(t884). The father's right to such child is inferior only to that of the
mother, hence, after her death, he has first claim to the child. Aycock v. Hampton, 84 Miss. 204 (1904); Pote's Appeal, 1o6 Pa. 574 (1884).
TARD

RECENT CASES
At common law, it was the mother who was under the duty of supporting
the child, but in nearly all jurisdictions statutes permit bastardy proceedings to
be brought against the father to compel him to contribute to the maintenance
of the child. Simmons v. Bull, 2t Ala. 5ox (1852); Wright v. Wright, 2 Mass.
xo 9 (z8o6). Now that the father must support the child, it is logical that the
law should permit the father the privilege of at least visiting the child to see that
the money supplied by him has been wisely and properly expended in the maintenance and education of the child even though it may still refuse to him the custody
of the child, as long as the mother is living. This is the conclusion reached by
the principal case which presented a question of first impression.
PLEADING-COmPLAINT-SEPARATE CAUSES OF AcTioN-Plaintiff's allegations in his complaint were that his realty was injured in the construction by
defendant subway company of additional stairways in front of his premises, so
as to injure his property, and that defendant by the permanent erection and mainld, Under the Code,
tenance of such stairways had injured his property.
ection 483, "Where the complaint sets forth two or more causes of action, the
statement of the facts constituting each cause of action must be separate and
numbered." There are two distinct legal wrongs alleged, one based on the
temporary obstructions and the other in maintaining permanent obstructions;
they must be separately stated and numbered. Stines v. New York, 138 N. Y.
Suppl. 962 (1912).
"All of the codes require that the different causes of action should be separately stated ......
At the common law, these separate divisions of the declaration were termed 'counts."' Pomeroy "Code Remedies" ( 4 th edition),
sec. 442.
The test to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged differ.nt causes of
action is stated in the principal case as being, if the facts alleged show one primary right of thc plaintiff and one wrong done by the defendant, involving that
right, the plaintiff has but a single cause of action. But if the facts alleged in the
pleading show that plaintiff is possessed of two or more distinct and separate
primry rights, each of which has been invaded, or that the defendant has committed
two or
morc distinct
separate
wrongs,
the plaintiff t44
has two
or 260
more(1906);
causes
Mich.
v. Cavanaugh,
Knowles
sec. 256;
Pomeroy
of action.

Banks v. Galbraith, 149 Mo. 529 (1899); Kruger v. Lumber Co., ti Idaho 504
(19o5).

Separately numbering the paragraphs in a pleading intended to set up only
a single cause of action or defense does not viiate the pleading, if but a single
cause of action or defense is in fact pleaded. Waitev. Sabel, 62 N. Y. Suppl.

(1904).
178 law
Gos, 13
Winter
419 An
(1899);
for negligence cannot be joined i
common
at \Wyo.
damages
for v.
action
count with one for statutory negligence. McHugh v. Trnsit Co.,
the sie
false
oneY.forSuppl.
malicious
anaaction
nor can in
85 (1905);
Mo. nent
190
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v. Mitchell, and
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The scheme or artifice need not be unlawful in itself, or constitute a fraud.
either at common law or by statute. U.S. v. Loring, 91 Fed. 881 (1884). It is
sufficient if its purpose is to defraud, and the mails are used, U. S. v. Wooten.
29 Fed. 702 (1887); Durland v. U. S., 161 U. S. 3o6 (1895); U. S. v. McAnulty,

187 U. S. 94 (1902), and may. in fact, have been utterly ineffective.

Durland

v. U. S., supra.

But in all there must be the underlying intent. U. S. v. McAnulty, supra;
Wilson v. U. S. i9o Fed. 427 (1911). The "schemes" which have been punished have smacked of confidence games. Wilson v. U. S., supra; Foster v.
U. S. 178 Fed. z65 (1go).
PROPERTY-AOjox0UiG

LAND

OWNERs-LIGHT

AND VENTMATixo-An

owner of real property, the rear of which abuts on land on which a tenement house
is constructed. has no property right in the adjoining owner's compliance with
abuilding.
statute requiring
leaving of a vacant space or yard in the rear of tenement
it. Murphy, ioo N. E. Rep. 643 (Mass., I913).
Rudnickthe
In England a land-owner may acquire an casement of light and air by the
maintenance of windows over a vacant lot or open space, for twenty years.
Toplig i. Jones, 34 L. J. C. P. 342 (Eng., 1865); Chastey vt. Ackland (t895), 2
Ch. 389 (Eng., 1895); Stoko v. Hew Snigers, 8 E. & B. 31 (Eng., 1857). In
America, the doctrine that ancient lights may be acquired by prescription has
not generally been adopted, although an easement of light and air can be created
by express grant. Jesse French Piano and Organ Co. v. Forbes, 129 Ala. 471
(i9oo); Haverstick v. Sip, 33 Pa. 368 (1859); Kotz v. I. C. R. R. Co., x88 IL
578 (1go). It was held that such a right can be acquired in Clawson v. Prinrose, 6 Del. Ch. 643 (1873). Where a grantor of lands has two adjoining lots
and grants one with a house containing windows facing the other lot the grantee
has a right to the use of such windows without interruption by the grantor or his
grantees. Palmer v. Fletcher, I Lev. 123 (Eng., x663); Rosewell v. Pryor, 6
MOd. 116 (Eng.. 1602). The general rule in America on this point is that there
must be an express covenant. Rennyson's Appeal, 94 Pa. 147 (t88o); Doyle v.
Lord, 64 N. Y. 432 (1876); Christ Church v. Lavezello, 156 Mass. 89 (1892).

Where such light and air is necessary for reasonable enjoyment of the premises
the grantee has a right to such an casement but he has no such right where it
would be merely a matter of convenience. Rennyson's Appeal, supra. Greerv.
Van Meter, 54 N. J. Eq. 270 (1896); Turner v. Thompson, 58 Ga. 268 (1877).
It would seem from the principal case that a statute such as the one in that case
does not create a right of light and air where there was none at common law.
Haggerty v. McGovern, 187 Mass. 479 (19os)PROPERTY-JoIN" TENANCY-WORK

NECESSARY

TO CREATE-In Over-

heiser v. Lackey, ioo N. E. 738 (N. Y., 19t3), a testator had left property "to
my daughters, Eliza Jane Marsh and Hester Marsh, jointly." On the death of
one of the daughters the question arose whether or not the other took by survivor.
ship. The court held that this devise did not create a joint tenancy. The use
of the word "jointly" was not controlling, in view of the fact that the will was
not drawn by a lawyer, and of the evident inaccurate and loose use of other legal
terms, coupled with the fact that the legislature had declared against joint tenancies unless they were expressly stated to be such.
Joint tenanc, though a favored estate at the common law, Co. Litt. 182a,
has been regarded by the modern courts as productive of injustice, and they have,
where possible, construed against joint tenancy. 2 Jarm. Wills 1123; Whittlesey
it. Fuller, ii Conn, 340 (1836); Davis i. Smith, 4 Harrington 68 (Del., 1836).
There are in almost every jurisdiction statutes providing that a joint tenancy
shall not be deemed created unless plainly apparent or expressly declared. Freeman, Cotenancy, 2d ed. § 5. But a conveyance under such a statute to two
persons jnintly was held a joint tenancy in Case it. Owen, 139 Id. 22 (1894);
conira, Davis i. Smith, supra. A devise to several persons nd the survivors
of them is a cearer case. Apgar v. Christophers, 33 Fed. 201 (t887); Davis
v. Smith, supra.

In some states the legislature has converted all joint tenancies into tenancies

in common.

i Stim Am. St. L. § 1371 (a); Lowe v. Brooks, 23 Ga. 325 (t857).

RECENT CASES
Other jurisdictions have simply abolished the incident of survivorship.
freeman, Cotenancy, 2d ed., § 35; Bambaugh v. Bambaugh, I I S. & R. 193 (Pa.,
1824).
joint tenancy is generally upheld, by statute and decision, in the cases of
gifts to trustees, in which cases survivorship is to be desired. Parsons v. Boyd,
2o Ala. 112 (1857); Webster v. Vandeventer, 6 Gray 428 (Mass., 1856); R R. v.
Navigation Co., 36 Pa. 204 (i86o); Saunders v. Schriaelzle, 49 Cal. 59 (1874).
It is still possible, in the face of the statutes to create joint tenancies, by expressing such an intent in the clearest language. Stimpson v. Batteman, 5 Cush.
155 (Mass., 1849); Arnold v. Jack's Exrs., 24 Pa., 57 (1854).
In many states statutes provide for a joizt.tenancy as to homesteads. Freeman, Cotenancy, 2d ed.. 1 47PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSIoN-PoWERS,

AND

CONSTRUCTION

OF

NEw

YORK AcT-Under the New York Public Service Commission Act, Laws of
N. Y. (19o7), p. 93o, in construing § 68, which reads briefly as follows: "No
gas corporation or electrical corporation .

.

.

. shall begin construction, or

exercise any right or privilege under any franchise hereafter granted, or under
any franchise heretofore granted but not heretofore actually exercised, without
first having obtained the permission and approval of the proper commission,"
it was held that the consent and approvaI of the commission must be obtained
for the construction of a new plant by a corporation in existence at time of the
adoption of the act. The effect of the decision is that the clause relating to
construction is not qualified by the subsequent clause relating to franchises, "hereafter granted or heretofore granted but not actually exerci'ed," so that any new
construction, even though it be a further use of an old franchise which had been
exercised before the enactment of this statute, required the approval of the commission. By this interpretation, 1 68 was given the same effect as § 53, referring to railroads and similar corporations, which was so worded as to permit
of no other construction than this. By amendment passed after this action was
instituted, § 68 was made to read similarly to 153 (Cons. Laws, 1910, 1 48,
1 68). After reaching the above conclusion the court held that no bond, would
be issued under § 69 for the construction unless the latter had been previously
.approved under § 68.
In Maryland there is an act quite similar in this respect to the New York
Act, Bagby; Annotated Code, 1911, title, corporations, § 447, 448) and it would
probably be open to the same construction.
It was also held in the principal case that a rival company was an "aggrieved
party" within the meaning of the New York Code, and that it could intervene
in the proceedings before the commission and would have the right to appeal.
The decision in this respect appears to be in accord with People v. Public Service
Commission, 195 N. Y. 157 (i9o9), but Cullen, C. J., gave a very lengthy dissenting opinion on the theory that this adjudication by the Public Service Commission would not be binding as to the relator, the rival corporation, and that
the necessity of defendant's franchise could be determined by a separate action
between the two corporations.
REAL EsTATz BROKERS-COMMzISSIONS ON UNCOMPLETED SALEs-A broker
employed to sell a property produced a purchaser with whom the owner of
the property entered into a valid contract. Although the sale was never completed by the purchaser, it was held that the broker was entitled to his commission for, in securing a pLrson whom the owner, by entering into the agreement of sale, accepted as satisfactory, he had done all that he was required to
do. Payner v. Ponder, 77 S. E. Rep. 32 (Ga., 1913).
In the absence of controlling terms in the contract of employment, the
general rule is that a broker becomes entitled to his commissions when he has
produced to his principal a purchaser who is ready, able, and willing to purchase upon the terms prescribed in the contract between the principal and
broker. Blougher v. Clark, 81 Kan. 250 (19o9); Watkins v. Thomas, 141 Mo.
App. 263 (19o); Clendenen v. Pancoast, 75 Pa. 213 (1874); Reed's Exs. v. Reed,
82 Pa. 420 (1876); Middleton v. Thompson, 163 Pa. 112 (1894). Some cases
hold that the principal and purchaser must enter into an enforceable contract
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before the broker is entitled. Boyd v. Improved Prop. Co., z35 N. Y. App 623 (igo9); Pfanz v. Humburg, 82 Ohio x (1910); Keys v. Johnson. 68 Pa. 42
(1871); Enyeart i. Figard, 38 Pa. Super. Ct. 488 (1909). But if a valid agreement of sale is entered into, the broker's right is not affccted by the subsequent
failure of the principal to perform. Cohen v. Ames, 205 Mass. 186 (1910);.
Herrick v. Woodsoa, 143 Mo. App. 258 (i io); Veeder i. Seaton, 85 N. Y. App.
191 (1913);
Freilich v. Tucker, 68 N. Y. Misc. 318 (igxo); DeWolf v. Ice Co..
141 Wls - 239 (191o); or by subsequent refusal of purchaser to take title because
of defect in princij~i' title, Tackett v. Powley, 130 Ill. App. 97 (906); King
v. Kiowles, 122 N. Y. App. 414 (I907); Arnold v. Nat. Bk., 126 Wis. 362 (1905),
unless the broker had notice or knowledge, Corbin v. Bk., 121 N. Y. App. 744
(1907); Montgomery v. Awoler, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 216 (I9O9); or. by purchaser's:
refusal to take because of principal's misrepresentations, Dotsen v. Milliken,
209 U. S. 237 (19O7); Hannan v. Moran, 71 Mich. 261 (1888).
And the weight
of authority is with the leading case in that if, after a valid contract has been
entered into, the sale fail because of the financial inability of the purchaser, thebroker is nevertheless, in the absence of fraud, entitled to his commissions.
Moore v. Irvin, 89 Ark. 289 (i909); Shainwald v. Cady, 92 Cal. 83 (x89z); Alt
v. Doscher, 186 N. Y. 566 (19o6); Coles v. Meade, 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 334 (1897);
contra, Beale v. Bond, 84 L. T. N. S. 313 (Eng., i9ox); Riggs v. Turnbull, zo5.
TMd. 135 (1907); Butler v. Baker, 17 R. 1. 582 (1891).
SALES-REsCISSION FOR FRAUD---In White Sewing Machine Co. v. Bullock,
76 S. E. Rep. 634 (N. C., 1912), the plaintiff's agent represented to the defendant
that a local competitor selling plaintiff's machines had discontinued the salethereof. Defendant, induced by these statements, purchased a large number
of machines for that locality. He later learned, however, that the statement
had been false as his competitor had recently purchased a large order. It was
held that such misrepresentation constituted fraud and not mere puffing orpromissory representations, and therefore defendant might rescind the con.
tract.
In contracts of sale disclosure is not ordinarily incumbent on the seller, therule being caeat emptor, and the mere failure to disclose material facts does not
of itself constitute fraud. Farrell v. Manhattan Co., 198 Mass. 271 (19o8);
Kentzing v. McElrath, 5 Pa. .167 (18t6). But a literal speaking of the truth,
if intended to accomplish a fraud, may be as fraudulent as a falsehood. Buford
v. Caldwell, 3 Mo. 477 (1834).
"The essential elements of fraud are intention, deception, materiality,
reliance, loss." Burdick's Elements of Sales, io6. The false representation is
material if the fact untruly asserted or wrongfully suppressed, if it had been
known to the party, would have influenced his judgment or decision in making
the contract at all. McAleer v. tIorsey, 35 Md. 439 (1871); Fishblate v. Fidelity
Co., 14o N. C. 589 (19o6). To protect himself, the buyer must require the
seller to give a warranty of any matter the risk of which he is unwilling to assume. Morrison v. Koch, 32 Wis. 254 (1873).
Fraud renders the sale voidable. Hewitt v. Clark, 91 Ill. 605 (1879); but
the contract must be avoided, if at all, within a reasonable timpe. Boles v. Mer-rill, 17,3 Mass. 491 (1899).
SALES-TRANSFER OF TiTLu-Although both vendor and vendee treated
a contract for the sale of a large quantity of damaged meal as vesting title in
vendee, nevertheless, as it appeared that vendor never had that quantity on.
hand or any quantity set aside for vendee, but only a large quantity of grain
from which in process of manufacture the meal would have b-en produced, it
was held that no title in any undelivered meal had passed.' Chandler Graiii Co.
v. Shea, ioo N. E. Rep. 663 (Mass., r913).
can4 pass
settled
that a it.vendor
andof wel
The doctrine
is universal
to goods
not in being
at the time
the sale,
Langton
lliggins,
H. &no
N. title
402
(Eng., 1859); Schreiber v. Butler, 84 Id. 576, 583 (1882); Robinson it. Stricklin,
73 Neb. 242 (i9o5); WVilson it. Empire Salt Co., 50 N. Y. App. 11z4 (19oo), sermb!e;
Shaarpsville Func
o. it. Snyder, 223 Pa. 372 099,ecp in cases of potential possession. Hull it. Hull, 48 Conn. 250 (i88o), young of animals; Van,

RECENT CASES
Hoozer v. Cory, 34 Barb. 9 (N. Y., x86o), product of animals; Briggs v. U. S.,143 U. S. 346 (8gi); Hills v. Edmund Co., 1o Pac. Rep. io88 (Cal., igxo);
Farmer's Bk. v. Coyner, 44 Ind. App. 335 (19o9), crops; Manly v. Betzer, 91
Ky. 596 (1891), wages under existing contract; but ff. Rochester Co. v. Rosey,
142 N. Y. 57o (1894); Merch. Bk. v. Lovejoy, 84 Wis. 6oi (i893).
A contract
for the sale of future goods is purely executory. Bates v. Smith, 83 Mich. 347
(189o). No title passes until, after the goods have come into existence, the seller
appropriates them in completion cf the contract, i. e. in accordance with the
prior directions of vendee. Stewart v. Ilenningsen Produce Co., 129 Pac. Rep.
18o (Kan., 1913); The Elgee Cotton Cases, 22 Wall. 18o (1874); Heiser v. Mears,
12o N. C. 443 (1897); West Jersey R. Co. v. Car Works Co., 32 N. J. L 517
(r866); Sempel v. Lumber Co., 142 Iowa 586 (i909); Henderson v. Jennings,
228 Pa. 188 (191o); Am. Hide Co. v. Chalkley, iol Va. 458 (1903); or, as in the
most common case, until delivery. Cobb, Bates & Yerpa Co. v. Hills, 208 Mass.
270 (191i); Dentzel v. Park Assoc., 229 Pa. 403 (i9Ix).
SALES-WARRANTY- I TENT-The defendants had underwritten a large
number of shares in a rubber and produce company. The plaintiff asked the
defendants whether they were bringing out a rubber company and received an
affirmative reply. HIe then asked whether the company was all right. To
this the defendants replied, "We are bringing it out" and plaintiff rejoined,
"That is good enough for me." The plaintiff bought the shares which fell in
value. The suit was for breach of warranty, the alleged w.-arranty being that
the company was a rubber company. The jury found that the company was
not a rubber company and the defendant had given the warranty. Held: The
question of warranty was improperly left to the jury as there was no evidence to be
submitted. The circumstance that the vendee assumes to assert a fact of which
the purchaser is ignorant, though valuable as evidence of intention, is not conduszre. Ileilbert, Symons & Co. v. Buckleton, L. R. 1913 A. C. zz (Eng.).
Lord Atkinson affirms the dictum of Buller, J., in Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T.
R. 51 (789), where he said: "It was rightly held by Holt, C.J., in Crosse v.
Gardner (Conn. 90, 1689) and 'Medina v. Stoughton (i Salk. 210, i699) and
has uniformly been adopted ever since, that an affirmation at the time of the sale
is a warranty, provided it appears on evidence to have been joinlended."; Although
the cas cited by Buller, J., will not bear him out, nevertheless this has become
the law of England. Carter v. Crick, 4 H1.& N. 412 (1859), Stuckley v. Baily,
I H. & C. 405 (1862), and the principal case.
In America the weight of authority is contra to the English rule. Stroud
v. Pierce, 6 Allen 413 (Mass., 1863). "The intent of the party is immaterial;'
Shippen v. Bowen, 122 U. S. 575 (1887); McClhntock v. Emick, 87 Ky. 16o
(888); Fairbanks v. Metzgar, 118 N. Y. 26o (i89o); Ingraham v. R. R., 19
R. I. 356 (1896). Yet in Pennsylvania the English rule of intent is adopted
due to the decision of Gibson, C. J., in Borreckin v. Bevan, 3 Rawle 23 (1831);
and affirmed in Pyott v. Baltz, 38 Pa. Sup. Ct. 613 (i909).
The court, per Lord Moulton, overrules the diclum in Cane v. Coleman, 3
Man. Ry. 2 (1828) and DeLassalle v. Guildford, 2 K. B. 215 (1901). In the
latter case, A. L. Smith, M. R., said the decisive test of intention was "whether
the vendor assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant or merely
states an opinion or judgment of which the vendor has no special knowledge and
on which the buyer may be expected also to have no opinion and to exercise
his judgment." Lord Moulton said that this was not the "decisive test"
because it disregards the material element of intention of the parties as to whether
the affirmation was to bepart of the contract. Williston "Sales," p. 253 (1909
Ed.) cites De Lassalle v. Guildford, for the point that "little stress seems to have
been laid on the requirement of intent," but as this has been overruled in the
principal case, it cannot be taken as authority.
TENDER-WAT CONSTITUTr-s-Tender is ad unconditional offer of a debtor
to the creditor of the amount of his debt. It is the real amount of the debt as
fixed by the law, the purpose being to enable the debtor to relieve himself of
interest and costs, and to relieve his property of incumbrance by offering his
creditors all that he has any right to claim. It does not mean that the debtor
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,must offer an amount beyond reasonable dispute, but the amount actually due.
Kelley v. Clark, 129 Pac. 921 (Idaho, 19z3).
It is an offer to pay a debt or to perform a duty. 9 Bacon Abr. At the
common law, wherever there is a debt or duty due and the thing due is either
certain, or capable of being made so by mere computation, a tender of the debt
or duty may be made; Solomon v. Bewicke, 2 Taunt. 317 (181o); Green v. Shurtliff, 19 Vt. 592 (1847). But at the common law a tender is not allowed where
the amount of the compensation is unliquidated, whether the right to the compensation is based upon a breach of a contract, or is one arising out of a tort.
Lawrence v. Gifford, 17 Pick. 366 (Mass., 1835); Gregory V. Wells, 62 I1. 232
(1871); Davys v. Richardson, 21 Q. B. D. 202 (1888). This has been changed
by statute in manyjurisdictions. Viall v. Carpenter; 16 Gray 285 (Mass., i86o):
Frantz v. Rose, 89 IlL 590 (1878).
Nothing short of an offer of everything that the creditor is entitled to receive is sufficient, and a debtor must at his peril tender the entire sum due.
Coleman v. Ross, 46 Pa. 18o (1863); Graham v. Linden, So N. Y. 547 (1872);
Cheney v. Roodhouse, 135 Il1. 257 (189o); Kingsley v. Anderson, io3 Minn. 510
(t908). The debtor must do and offer everything that is necessary on his part
to complete the transaction, and must fairly make known his purpose without
ambiguity.

Lilienthal v. McCormick. 117 Fed. 89

(19o2).

The thing to be tendered must be actually produced and offered to the
party entitled thereto, a mere offer to pay being insufficient. 34 Ala. 126 (1859);
Chase v. Welsh, 45 Mich. 345 (188o); Deering Harvester Co. v. Hamilton, So
Minn. 162 (1900). The tender must be unconditional Coghlan v. S. C. R.
Co., 32 Fed. 3x6 (1887); Cornell v. Huyden, I

Roberts,

126

Wis.

4

N. Y. 271 (1889); Mann v.

142 (1905).

TORTs--MALrCious PROSECUTION-PROBABLE CAUSE-Information received from apparently respectable persons and believed to be credible, as to
the commission of an offense, is sufficient evidence of probable cause for prosecution against the offender. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Stephenson, 60 So. Rep.
49o (Ala., 1912).

In malicious prosecution, absence of probable cause is an essential element
to plaintiff's case, De%-ain v. Descabo, 66 Cal. 415 (1885); and it is therefore fulljustification that the defendant had good reasons for taking proceedings. White
hurst v. Ward, 12 Ala. 264(1847). To constitute probable cause the defendant
must have had a real and honest belief based upon such facts and circumstances
as would have aroused a reasonable suspicion of guilt in a prudent person. Hitson
v. Sim, 6 Ark. 439 (3901); McClafferty v. Philip, 15! Pa. 86 (1892). The facts
upon which the defendant --elied may be those within his personal knowledge
or those which he learns from proper information derived from statements of
others. Shafer v. Hertzog, 92 Minn. 17! .(9o4); French v. Smith, 4 Vt. 363
(1832); but such information must come from credible sources. De-ain v.
b
o
Descalo, 66 Cal. 415 (1885); Smith v. Ege, 52 Pa. 19 (1865).
As a general rule it is a good defense to an allegation of want of probabl
cause to show that the defendant acted under the advice of counsel after having
placed the facts before him. Donnelly v. Dagget, 145 Mass. 314 (1887); Neufield v. Rodeminskir, 144 Ill. 83 (1893); Walter v. Sample, 25 Pa. 275 (1855).
Theadvice must be that of a practising attorney, Stanton v. Hart, 27 Mich. 5s9
(1873). The advice must have been honestly sought, Ames v. Snider, 69 11.
376 (1873); and defendant must show he stated all the facts fully and fairly without exaggeration and without witholding any. Stevens v. Fassett, 27 Me. 266
(1847); Flora v. Russell, z38 Ind. 153 (1894); and that he resorted to advice of
counse lin good faith, Fisher v. Forrester, 33 Pa. 501 (1859). Discharge of plaintiff

by magistrate is prima faie evidence of want of probable cause, but not conclusive, Barbight v. Tamany, 158 Pa. 545 (t893). Want of probable cause can
never be implied from malice. Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187 ( 878); McCasland v. Kniberlin, 0ooInd. 121 (1884). Want of probable cause means want
only at time of commencement of the proceedings, Fox V. Smith, 25 R. 1. 255
(1903). The same principles determine the question as to want of probable
cause where defendant has instituted civil proceedings as in criminal proceed
ings. Nicholson v. Coghill, 4 B. & C. 21 (Eng., 1824); Stewart v. Sonneborn

RECENT CASES
supra. Probable cause in England is a matter of law for the court while in
America a matter of mixed law and fact. Leahy v. March, 155 Pa. 458 (1893);
Besson v. South- ard, io N. Y. 236 (1851).
TORTS-RELEASE Or ONE JOINT TORT-FEASoR-A release of one joint tortfeasor, unless expressly reserving the right to pursue the others, releases all, even
though the one claimed by the injured party to be liable, and who was released
for a consideration, was in fact not liable. Casey v. Auburn Telephone Co., 139
N. Y. Suppl. 579 (1913).
The majority of the decisions on the subject support the principal case,
holding with it that the party injured, by accepting satisfaction from another.
is estopped from saying that he had no claim against him, and therefore, it is
wholly immaterial from whom such satisfaction is received. Tompi ns v. Clay
Street R. R. Co., 66 Cal. 163 (1884); Miller v. Back, zo8 Ia. 575' (899); Leddy
v. Barney, 139 Mass. 394 (1885); Hartigan v. Dickson, 8 Minn. 284 (19oo);
Leither v. P. R. T. Co., 125 Pa. 397 (1889). A mere gift or gratuity from one
against whom no claim is asserted will not, however, operate as a satisfaction so
as to release the person who caused the injury. Sieber v. Amundsen, 78 VI.
679 (t891).
In those jurisdictions holding contra to Casey v. Telephone Co., supra, it
Is argued that any consideration received from one not actually liable cannot
-operate by way of estoppel inasmuch as the party not released is no party or
privy to the arrangement, and, therefore, such consideration ought not to be
regarded as a satisfaction. Western Tube Co. v. Zang, 85 I1. App. 63 (1899);
Kentucky Bridge Co. v. Hall, 125 Ind. 220 (189o); Wardell v. McConnell, 25
Neb. 558 (1889).
TOR-"SSADOWIxG" A Pumo.-LAB£L£TY-The plaintiff who had
been a witness against the defeidant company, was kept under constant and
-continued surveillance by defendant's detectives, who employed open or "rough
shadowing." Among other things plaintiff showed that he had been dismissed
from his employment by reason of defendant's acts. Held, that open or "rough
shadowing" of a citizen by private detectives so as publicly to proclaim him a
suspect who deserves watching, is actionable as defamation. Schultz v. Frankfort Ins. Co., i39 N. W. Rep. 386 (Wis., 1913).
This is an extension of the law of defamation as ordinarily recognized. In
general, defamatioti is said to consist of a defamatory statement which, when
oral, constitutes slander, and, when written, libel. Salmond, Torts (3d Ed.),
406. Slander, in general, is perceptible only by the ear; and libel, only by the
eye. But a defamatory communication made by means of finger-signs is slan.
der, not libel. Frazer, Libel and Slander, (4 th Ed.) 3.
Various forms of libel other than written or printed statements have, however, been recognized. So, dishonoring plaintiff's checks by a banker who has
sufficient funds in hand belonging to plaintiff. Rolin v. Stewart, 23 L. J. C. P.
£48 (1854); putting a lantern, the well-known sign of a bawdy-house, before
plaintiff's door, Jffrs
v. Duncombe, II East 226 (Eng., 18o9); fixing gallows
•against plaiiitiff's door, Hawkins, Pleas of Crown (8th Ed.), 1, 542; giving plain.
tiff's tavern the repute of a bawdy house by bringing whores or men dressed as
whores thereto, Plumket v. Gilmore, Fortesue 211 (£724); placing a wax figure
-of plaintiff among those of notorious felons, Monson v. Tussand, L R. (1894)
zQ.. 67; burning or hanging plaintiff in efig, Eyre v. Garlick, 42 J. P. 68
(Eng., 1878); Johnson v. Comm., £4 At. 4.25 (Pa., 1888): exhibiting a picture
.of one in a disgraceful position. DuBost v. Beresford, 2 Campb. 511 (£8o).
See 5 Co. 126 (I606). Perhaps the cases nearest to the facts of the principal
case are those of "riding Skimmington" which was a mode of ridiculing a hen.
pecked husband, Rex v. Roberts, 3 Keble 578 (1674); Cropp v. Tilney, 3
Salk. 22.5 (t694). In an unreported case from Lower Canada, cited in Townshend, Libel and Slander (4th Ed.), 2, note, one who took up the collection in a
church, for the purpose of humiliating plaintiff, passed him by without giving
him an opportunity to contribute. And it was held that the defendant was
liable as he was bound to perform his services, though gratitutious, without
subjecting anyone to ridicule.

